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ABSTRACT 
We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on 
trust.  Trust in the manager reduces an investor’s perception of the riskiness of a given investment, 
and allows managers to charge fees.  Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, 
but because of trust fees do not fall to costs.  In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher 
expected  return,  managers  on  average  underperform  the  market  net  of  fees,  but  investors 
nevertheless  prefer  to  hire  managers  to  investing  on  their  own.    When  investors  hold  biased 
expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.   
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It has been known since Jensen (1968) that professional money managers on average underperform 
passive  investment  strategies  net  of  fees.    Gruber  (1996)  estimates  average  mutual  fund 
underperformance of 65 basis points per year; French (2008) updates this to 67 basis points per 
year.  But such poor performance of mutual funds is only the tip of the iceberg.  Many investors pay 
substantial fees to brokers and investment advisors, who then direct them toward the mutual funds 
that underperform (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Chalmers and Reuter (2012), Del 
Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010), Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012)).  Once all fees are 
taken into account, some studies find 2% investor underperformance relative to indexation.
1  This 
evidence is difficult to reconcile with the view that investors are comfortable investing in a low-fee 
index fund on their own, but nonetheless seek active managers to improve performance.         
In fact, performance seems to be only part of what money managers seek to deliver.  Many 
leading investment managers and nearly all registered investment advisors advert ise their services 
based not on past performance but  instead on trust, experience, and dependability (Mullainathan, 
Schwartzstein, and Shleifer  (2008)).  Some studies of mutual funds note that investors hiring 
advisors must be obtaining some benefits apart   from portfolio returns  (Hortacsu and Syverson 
(2004)).  We take this perspective seriously and propose an alternative view of money management 
that is based on the idea that investors do not know much about finance, are too nervous or anxious 
to make risky investments on their own, and hence hire money managers and advisors to help them 
invest.  Managers may have  knowledge of how to diversify  or even ability to earn alpha, but  in 
addition they provide investors peace of mind.  We focus on individual investors, but similar issues 
apply to institutional investors (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)).  
Critically,  we  do  not  think  of  trust  as  deriving  from  past  performance.    Rather,  trust 
describes confidence in the manager that is based on personal relationships, familiarity, persuasive 
advertising, connections to friends and colleagues, communication, and schmoozing.  There are (at 
least) two distinct aspects of such trust.  The first, stressed by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 
2008) and Georgarakos and Inderst (2011), sees trust as security from expropriation or theft.  The 3 
 
other aspect, emphasized here, has to do with reducing investor anxiety about taking risk. With U.S. 
securities laws, most investors in mutual funds probably do not fear that their money will be stolen; 
rather, they want to be “in good hands.” 
We think of money doctors as families of mutual funds, registered investment advisors, 
financial planners, brokers, funds of funds, bank trust departments, and others who give investors 
confidence to take risks.   Some investors surely do not need advice and invest on their own, 
although Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) suggest that many such investors do not diversify 
properly.   But many other investors, ranging from relatively poor employees asked to allocate their 
defined contribution pension plans (Chalmers and Reuter (2012)) to millionaires hiring “wealth 
managers” rely on experts to help them invest in risky assets and thus earn higher expected returns.  
On their own, these investors would not have the time, the expertise, or the confidence to buy risky 
assets, and just leave their money in the bank.  
In our view, financial advice is a service, similar to medicine.  We believe, contrary to what 
is presumed in the standard finance model, that many investors have very little idea of how to 
invest, just as patients have a very limited idea of how to be treated.  And just as doctors guide 
patients toward treatment, and are trusted by patients even when providing routine advice identical 
to that of other doctors, in our model money doctors help investors make risky investments and are 
trusted to do so even when their advice is costly, generic, and occasionally self-serving.  And just as 
many patients trust their doctor, and do not want to go to a random doctor even if equally qualified, 
investors trust their financial advisors and managers.       
  We present a model of the money management industry in which the allocation of assets to 
managers is mediated by trust. We model trust as reducing the utility cost for the investor of taking 
risk, much as if it reduces the investor’s subjective perception of the risk of investments.  Critically, 
managers differ in how much different investors trust them – an investor who trusts a particular 
manager perceives returns on risky investments delivered by this manager as less uncertain than 4 
 
those delivered by a less trusted manager.  We discuss alternative ways of modeling investor trust, 
but argue that ours is both natural and consistent with the data.   
In particular, an investor would prefer to make a given investment with the manager he 
trusts most, enabling that manager to charge the investor a higher fee and still keep him.  Even if 
managers compete on fees, these fees do not fall to costs, and substantial market segmentation 
remains.  In fact, in our model fees are proportional to expected returns, with higher fees in asset 
classes with higher risk and return.  Net of fees, investors consistently underperform the market, but 
experience less anxiety and earn higher expected returns than they would by investing on their own.  
A  very  simple  formulation  based  on  trust  thus  delivers  some  of  the  basic  facts  about  money 
management that the standard approach finds puzzling.
2  
  In this framework, under rational expectations managers charge high fees but at the same 
time enable investors to take more ris k.  Investors are better off , and there are no distortions in 
investment allocation between asset classes.   Interesting issues arise, however, when investors do 
not hold rational expectations and perhaps want to invest in hot asset classes or new products they 
believe will earn higher returns , such as internet stocks in the late 1990s .   Empirical evidence 
supports the role of investor extrapolation in financial markets (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer , and 
Vishny (1994), Hurd and Rohwedder (2012), Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)).  Do trusted money 
managers correct investors’ errors, or pander to their beliefs?  In our model, managers have a strong 
incentive to pander, precisely because pandering gets investors who trust the manager to invest 
more, and at higher fees.  Trust-mediated money management does not work to correct investor 
biases.    In  equilibrium,  money  managers  let  investors  chase  returns  by  proliferating  product 
offerings.   
We  also  consider  the  dynamics  of  professional  money  management,  including  the 
possibility that over time better performers attract more funds (Chevalier and Ellison (1999)).  In 
this context, we ask whether professional managers have an incentive to pursue contrarian strategies 
and try to beat the market.  We present a standard dynamic model of career concerns in which 5 
 
managers have the ability to earn alpha, and are rewarded for doing so by attracting fund flows, but 
we  augment  this  model  with  trust.    We  find  that  career  concern  incentives  are  significantly 
moderated by trust, because a manager must trade off the benefits of attracting future funds due to 
superior performance against the cost of discouraging trusting clients who want to invest in hot 
sectors  such  as  internet  stocks.    Current  profits  from  pandering  may  dominate  reputational 
incentives when manager-specific trust is important because such trust i) allows managers to charge 
high fees in hot assets, and ii) reduces investor mobility to better-performing managers.  As an 
example, value managers during the internet bubble had a strong incentive to switch to “growth-at-
the-right-price” and pander to their investors’ desire to hold technology stocks, even when these 
managers understood that technology stocks were overpriced.  Even with performance pressures, 
when trust is important there are strong incentives to pander to client biases and  only a weak 
incentive to bet against market mispricing.  This result has implications for the effectiveness of 
professional arbitrage, market efficiency, and financial stability.   
  Our paper is related to several areas of research.  Since Putnam (1993), economists have 
studied the role of trust in shaping economic and political outcomes (e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997), 
La Porta et al. (1997)).  In finance, this research was pursued most productively by Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2004, 2008), who show that trust in institutions encourages individuals to participate 
in financial markets, whether by opening checking accounts, seeking credit, or investing in stocks.  
Taking a related perspective, we stress the anxiety-reducing aspects of manager-specific trust rather 
than trust in the broader system.   
  In addition to voluminous research documenting poor performance of equity mutual funds, 
some  papers  document  net-of-fees  underperformance  by  bond  mutual  funds  (Blake,  Elton,  and 
Gruber (1993), Bogle (1998)) and hedge funds (Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001)).  An important 
finding of this work is that fees are higher in riskier (higher-beta) asset classes, so that managers 
appear to be paid for taking market risk.  One would not expect this feature in a standard model of 6 
 
delegated management in which only superior performance – alpha – should be rewarded.  Trust, 
however, naturally accounts for this phenomenon. 
  Following  Campbell  (2006),  financial  economists  have  considered  the  nature  and 
consequences of investment advice.  Some of these studies suggest that investment advice is so poor 
that managers chosen by the advisors underperform the market even before fees.  Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find that the highest fees are charged by managers with the worst performance.  
This finding is consistent with a central prediction of our model that managers cater to investor 
biases.   An audit study by Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012) similarly finds that advisors 
direct investors toward hot sector funds, pandering to their extrapolative tendencies.  In contrast, 
unbiased investment advice is ignored (Bhattacharya et al. (2012)).       
  Our study of incentives in money management follows, but takes a different approach from, 
traditional work on performance incentives (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1999)).  Two recent 
papers that address some of the issues we focus on here, but in the traditional context in which 
reputations are shaped entirely by performance, are Guerrieri and Kondor (2012) and Kaniel and 
Kondor (2013).   Closer to our work are the papers by Inderst and Ottaviani (2009, 2012a, 2012b), 
who focus on distorted incentives to sell financial products arising both from the difficulties of 
incentivizing salesmen to sell appropriate products and from actual kickbacks.   Hackethal, Inderst, 
and Meyer (2012) find empirically that investors who rely more heavily on advice have a higher 
volume  of  security  transactions  and  are  more  likely  to  invest  in  products  that  salesmen  are 
incentivized to sell.  Our focus is on the incentives of the money management organization itself 
when its clients’ choices are mediated by trust.     
Several papers ask whether agents have incentives to conform or be contrarian.  Outside of 
finance,  Prendergast  (1993),  Morris  (2001),  Canes-Wrone,  Herron,  and  Schotts  (2001),  and 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) present models in which agents pander to principals.  In finance, a 
large literature starting with Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 7 
 
(1992) describes the incentives for herding and conformism.  The novel feature of our model is its 
focus on trust as distinct from performance in shaping incentives.   
  In Section I we present our basic model of trust and delegation.  In Section II, we solve the 
model and show that even the simplest specification delivers some of the basic facts about the 
industry.  In Section III we extend the model to the case of multiple financial products.  In Section 
IV we examine the incentives of managers to pander to investors with biased expectations both in a 
static context and in a dynamic model in which managers can earn alpha if they pursue return-
maximizing strategies.  Section V concludes with a discussion of some implications of our model. 
 
I. The Basic Setup 
There are two periods            and a mass one of investors who enjoy consumption at 
          according to a utility function that we specify below.  At        , each investor is endowed 
with one unit of  wealth.  There are two assets.  The first asset is riskless (Treasuries or bank 
accounts), and yields          at        . The second asset is risky (e.g., equities or bonds); it yields 
an expected excess return   over the riskless asset, and has a variance of  . The risky asset is in 
perfectly elastic supply and riskless borrowing is unrestricted.  One can view this setup as a small 
open economy where the supply of assets adjusts to demand. We are thus looking at the portfolio 
choice problem taking asset prices and expected returns as given.   
At         , each investor   invests shares    and        of his wealth in the risky and riskless 
asset, respectively.  The investor can perfectly access the riskless asset but not the risky asset. The 
reason is that the risky asset requires management (e.g., to create a diversified portfolio) and the 
investor lacks the necessary expertise or time. Without expert money managers, the investor cannot 
take risk. This implies, in particular, that even an index fund investment requires a manager or an 
advisor; the investor does not want to make the investment on his own.
3  The assumption of no 
homemade risk-taking might seem too strong, but it enables us to show our results most clearly. It 
also sharpens the analogy to medicine, in which patients seek medical advice for all but the simplest 8 
 
and safest treatments.  It is not critical to our findings that investors do not take risk on their own, 
but rather that they take more risk with a manager.  Likewise, our results hold if some expert 
investors  are  not  anxious  about  making  risky  investments  on  their  own  and  do  so  without 
investment advice.  In this case, managers compete for the remaining investors who are anxious and 
do require investment advice.  
To implement the risky investment        the investor hires one of two managers,   or   
(for simplicity he cannot hire both).  Delegation requires investor trust. We introduce trust in the 
standard  model  of  portfolio  choice  where  investors  have  mean-variance  preferences.  We  first 
describe  our  setup  formally  and  then  discuss  it.    We  capture  investor  ’s  lack  of  trust  toward 
manager           by a parameter           that multiplies the investor’s baseline risk aversion.  
That is, the cost to investor i of bearing one unit of risk with manager j is given by       .  This idea 
is formalized by assuming that each investor i has the quadratic utility function 
    ( )    ( )  
    
 
   ( )  
The investor’s baseline risk aversion is normalized to ½.  His effective risk aversion in 
delegating to manager   is equal to              .  We can view      as the anxiety suffered by 
investor   for bearing risk with manager  .  In this setup, the assumption of no risk-taking without 
advice means that investor   is infinitely anxious when investing on his own.  Investor i suffers less 
anxiety if he delegates his risky investment to his most trusted manager.   
Half of the investors trust   more than  , the other half trust   more than  .  The anxiety 
suffered by investor   for bearing risk with his most trusted manager is equal to  .  The anxiety 
suffered by the same investor for bearing risk with his least trusted manager is equal to     , where 
     [   ].    That  is,  an  “ -trusting”  investor   suffers  anxiety           with  manager   and 
             with manager  ; a “ -trusting’’ investor   suffers anxiety              with manager   
and           with  manager  .    Parameter    captures  the  relative  trust  of  investor   in  his  less 
trusted  manager,  measuring  the  extent  to  which  the  two  managers  are  substitutes  from  the 9 
 
standpoint of investor  .  An investor with        sees the two managers as perfect substitutes.  An 
investor with        views his less trusted manager as an imperfect substitute for the more trusted 
one.    When          the  investor  suffers  infinite  anxiety  when  investing  with  his  less  trusted 
manager, just as he would when taking risk on his own. 
Investors vary in how much they trust one manager over the other.  In particular, in the 
population of investors    is uniformly distributed on [  –    ] for both  - and  -trusting investors.  
Parameter     [   ] captures the dispersion of trust in the population: the higher is  , the more 
investors trust one manager more than the other.  At   = 0, investors are homogeneous in the sense 
that they trust the two managers equally – this is the benchmark case of Bertrand competition.  With 
dispersion in trust levels, managers have some market power with respect to investors who trust 
them more, and optimally charge positive fees even in a competitive market.   Trust is permanent 
and does not depend on or change with returns. 
In sum, in our model attitudes toward risk are shaped by four parameters.  The first is 
baseline risk aversion, normalized to ½, which captures an investor’s preference over “neutral” bets 
(as elicited using lotteries in a lab experiment).  The second parameter is the investor’s anxiety 
         of taking financial risk on his own, reflecting the investor’s lack of confidence in his own 
financial expertise, which may  arise from his uncertainty or  ambiguity over the distribution of 
returns. The third parameter         captures the reduction in anxiety experienced by the investor 
when he takes financial risk with his most trusted manager.  This captures the comfort created by 
the trusted manager’s expertise, reflected, for instance, by a tighter perceived distribution of asset 
returns. The last parameter is the dispersion   in the trust that investors have in different managers.  
A higher   increases the anxiety experienced by the average investor when switching from his more 
to his less trusted manager.
4   
Two final comments are in order.  First, this specification is very different from the standard 
approach to the delegation problem, in which investors seek  advice to achieve a better risk-return 10 
 
combination rather than to gain some comfort or confidence in taking risk.  Second, we model trust 
in a manager as a parameter capturing the extra risk the investor is willing to bear to earn an extra 
unit of return.  This specification most accurately captures the idea that we seek to formalize, 
namely,  that  trust  in  managerial  expertise  tightens  the  distribution  of  returns  perceived  by  the 
investor, making it less costly for him to take risk. We view anxiety reduction in risk-taking to be a 
central function of delegated money management.   
Of course, other conceptions of trust, and thus other modeling choices, are possible.  One 
possibility is to assume that trust acts as an additive utility boost that the investor experiences from 
hiring  his  most  trusted  manager.    In  this  formulation,  trust  is  disconnected  from  risk-taking, 
implying that trusted managers will be hired even to invest in the riskless asset.  In the Internet 
Appendix we formally compare this model to our setup.
5  While this model does deliver the key 
prediction of negative market-adjusted returns from professional management, it does not yield 
other key predictions of our model, such as higher fees  on riskier investment products and high-
powered incentives to pander due to the sharing of perceived expected returns .  Trust can also be 
modeled as providing a multiplicative boost to the net expected return  (       ) that the investor 
obtains by delegating to a manager.  This model is formally equivalent to the anxiety-reduction 
mechanism in that trust increases the risk the investor is willing to bear to earn an extra return.   Of 
course, the interpretation of the two models is very different.   
At        ,  the  two  money  managers  compete  in  fees  to  attract  clients.    Each  manager 
          optimally chooses what fee     to charge per unit of assets managed.
6  Based on the fees 
simultaneously set by managers, each investor optimally decides how much to invest in the risky 
asset and under which manager.  At        , returns are realized and distributed to investors. Figure 
1 summarizes this timeline.  
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Figure 1. Timeline. 
 
II. Equilibrium Fees and the Size of Money Management 
A. The Investor’s Portfolio Problem 
The expected utility of investor   delegating to manager   an amount      of risky investment 
is equal to 
   (        )            (       )  
    
 
    
     
The investor’s excess return net of the management fee is equal to        .  By investing in the 
riskless asset, the investor obtains no excess return and pays no fees.   
Suppose  that  investor   has  hired  manager  .    Given  the  fee      the  investor  who  hires 
manager i chooses a portfolio   ̂    maximizing  (  ̂       ).  This portfolio is given by 
  ̂     
(       )
     
                                                                   ( ) 
The optimal portfolio is riskier (  ̂    is higher) if the investor hires a more trusted manager (having 
lower     ).  This effect plays a critical role in determining the fee structure.  The utility obtained by 
investor i under manager j is then equal to 
   (  ̂       )       
(       ) 
      
   
The investor chooses   over   provided that  (  ̂       )    (  ̂       ), which is equivalent to 
    
    
 
(       ) 
(       )                                                              ( ) 
          t = 0 
Each manager j = A, B sets his fee fj. 
Each investor i chooses his risky investment 
xi and his manager j. 
         t = 1 
Returns  are  realized  and 
distributed to investors. 12 
 
The investor chooses manager   over manager   provided that the investor’s relative trust for   is 
sufficient to compensate for the relative excess return (net of fee) expected under  .  Because of 
constant absolute risk aversion, higher variance   of investment reduces overall risk-taking but not 
the choice between   and  .  That choice is pinned down only by the differential anxiety and excess 
return obtained by the investor with the two managers.      
 
B. Management Fees and Risk-Taking 
Denote  by     
   the  optimal  amount  invested  by   under  manager   after  a  manager  is 
optimally selected in light of equation (2), where     
      if the investor hired manager   .  Then, 
at fee structure (   ,    ), the profit of money manager   charging     is given by 
  (       )         ∫     
 
 
                                                           ( ) 
which is the product of the fee     and assets under management. The profits of manager   depend on 
his competitor’s fee      via the assets under management.  
Let us derive the profits of  .  If   charges a higher fee than  , that is, if          , then the 
right-hand side of equation (2) is  greater than one.  Manager   does not attract any  -trusting 
investors (for whom              ); he can only attract some  -trusting investors.  These are the 
investors who have sufficiently low trust in B that they prefer to stick with   despite the higher fee, 
and  are  identified  by  the  condition      (       )  (       ) .    In  this  case,  assets  under  ’s 
management are given by 
(       )
  
  ∫
 
  
  
     [    (    )  (    ) ]
   
                                         ( ) 
Expression (4) is the product of the wealth invested by each of the  -trusting investors times the 
measure  of  them  that  chooses  manager  .  When           ,  the  profits  of  manager   are  the 
management fee     times the wealth under management in equation (4). 13 
 
Consider now the case in which   charges a lower fee than  , that is,          .  Because the 
right-hand side of equation (2) is below one, manager   attracts all  -trusting investors as well as 
some  -trusting investors. The latter investors are those with sufficiently high trust in  , that is, 
with      (       )  (       ) .    By  equation  (1),  each  -trusting  investor  places  under  ’s 
management only a fraction    of the wealth invested under   by  -trusting investors.  In this case, 
assets under  ’s management are given by 
(       )
  
  [
 
 
  ∫    
 
  
  
 
     [       (    )  (    ) ]
]                                  ( ) 
Expression (5) is the sum of the assets invested by  -trusting investors plus the assets invested by 
the  -trusting investors who found it optimal to switch to  .  When          , the profits of   are 
equal to the product of the management fee     and the assets under management in (5). 
Putting the above together, for any (       ), the profits   (       ) of manager   are given by      
{
 
 
 
      
(       )
  
 
     [      (       )  (       ) ]   (     )
  
             
     
(       )
  
  [
 
 
 
         [      (       )  (       ) ] 
  
]              
       ( ) 
The profit of manager   increases in the fee charged by  , since a higher     reduces investors’ net 
excess return under  , thus increasing  ’s clientele. In contrast, a higher     exerts an ambiguous 
effect on the profits of  . On the one hand, it increases the surplus extracted by the manager; on the 
other hand, it reduces assets under management (by reducing both investment by his clients on the 
intensive margin and the size of his clientele on the extensive margin).   
The  profits  of  manager   increase  in  the  risky  asset’s  gross  excess  return:  a  higher   
encourages any investor to put more money under management, which increases the preference of 
 -trusting  investors  for  .    Indeed,  manager   allows  these  investors  to  take  more  risk  than 
manager   by reducing their anxiety, which is particularly valuable when the excess return is high. 
Second, a higher dispersion of trust   exerts an ambiguous effect on profits – it increases them 
when   offers a lower net return than   (         ), but decreases them otherwise. 14 
 
By the same logic, at any (       ), the profit   (       ) of manager   is equal to 
{
 
 
 
      
(      )
  
  [
 
 
 
         [      (       )  (       ) ] 
  
]              
     
(      )
  
 
     [      (       )  (       ) ]   (     )
  
             
           ( ) 
The properties of (7) are analogous to those just discussed in the case of equation (6). 
Given profits   (       ) and   (       ), a competitive equilibrium in pure strategies is a 
Nash  Equilibrium  in  which  each  manager   optimally  sets  his fee     by  taking  his  competitor’s 
equilibrium fee     
   as given.  Formally, an equilibrium is a profile of fees (   
     
 ) such that  
   
                 (       
 )
   
                (   
     ). 
There is a unique symmetric competitive equilibrium in our model, characterized below.  All proofs 
are collected in the Internet Appendix.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: In the unique, symmetric, equilibrium of the model, fees are equal to 
   
       
    (
 
     
)   
 
 
                                                          ( ) 
Each investor delegates his portfolio to his most trusted manager. The total value of assets under 
management, equally split between   and    is given by 
∫ (    
        
  )  
 
  (
     
     
)  
 
   
                                                 ( ) 
 
The fee charged by each manager is a constant fraction of the expected excess return   
(above the riskless rate).  Intuitively, the manager extracts part of the expected surplus   that he 
enables the investor to access. The equilibrium fee does not depend on  : the ability of a manager to 
extract rents from his trusting clients does not depend on their level of anxiety, but on the increase 
in their anxiety when they switch managers. Parameter   captures exactly this point. In fact, the 
fraction of excess return extracted by the manager increases in  .  When      , all investors trust 
the two managers equally, so competition between identical managers drives equilibrium fees to 15 
 
zero.  In contrast, when        , fees are positive.  Now investors bear an anxiety cost of leaving 
their more trusted manager, which allows him to charge a positive fee.  However, investors take 
more risk with their more trusted manager than with the less trusted one (or on their own).  At the 
maximal dispersion of trust (     ), the two managers have huge market power and extract 1/4 of 
the excess return from their investors.  The model predicts that fees should be higher in sectors in 
which dispersion of trust is higher, perhaps owing to the absence of a market index or of established 
measures of risk.   
In  our  model,  management  fees  are  not  compensation  for  abnormal returns  (alpha)  but 
rather a way to share the risk premium between the investor and the manager.  The gross return of 
the managed portfolio equals the market excess return  , but the net return exhibits negative alpha 
once fees are netted out.  The model thus immediately delivers the most fundamental fact about 
delegated  portfolio  management,  namely,  that  professional  managers  on  average  earn  negative 
market-adjusted returns net of fees.  The reason is that investors are willing to pay for anxiety 
reduction rather than for alpha.   
The  size  of the  money  management  industry  (see  equation  (9))  increases in  the  excess 
return  , decreases in the general level of distrust or anxiety  ,  and decreases in the dispersion of 
trust  .  A higher   increases the surplus generated by the risky investment, which increases risk-
taking.  At the same time, an increase in   increases fees, which decrease risk-taking. The former 
effect dominates, so that higher excess return   boosts the size of the industry.
7 
A higher general level of trust (a lower  ) increases the size of the industry, bringing more 
assets out of the mattresses and into the financial system, a finding documented empirically by 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008).  Even though the overall level of trust does not affect 
equilibrium  fees,  it  shapes  the  extent  of  financial  intermediation  in  the  economy.    More 
differentiated trust across managers, as captured by a higher    increases their market power and 
management fees, and thus reduces the size of the industry.  Conditional on investors’ trust in their 
preferred money manager, assets under management are too small owing to management fees. 16 
 
To consider welfare implications, we compute the change in investor welfare that occurs 
when trusted money managers are made available, relative to a world in which delegation is not 
possible.   
 
COROLLARY 1: The presence of money managers improves investors’ welfare relative to a world 
in which everyone invests on his own. The social benefit of money management is equal to 
  
   
(
     
     
)
 
  
 
The benefit of money management is to increase risk-taking.  This benefit is  increasing in the 
expected return per unit of risk   √ , decreasing in average anxiety experienced with the most 
trusted manager  , and decreasing in  .   
The basic model might thus shed light on the central finding of the literature on financial 
advice,  namely,  that  many  investors  seek  it  despite  extremely  high  cost  and  poor  investment 
performance  (Bergstresser,  Chalmers,  and  Tufano  (2009),  Chalmers  and  Reuter  (2012),  Del 
Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010)).  In our view, investors see themselves as better off with the 
advice than without it since advice alleviates their anxiety about risk and enables them to take more 
risk.  Chalmers and Reuter (2012) actually show empirically that, among the investors predicted 
based on their demographic characteristics to use financial advisors, those who actually use them 
hold portfolios with higher betas ( .4 higher) than those who do not use advice.  As investors are 
increasingly asked to choose how to allocate their savings, rather than participate in, say, defined 
benefit plans, they need to make choices about risky investments or just put money in the bank.   
Financial advice in our model helps them take risk, even when it is generic (or worse).  With 
positive expected returns to risk-taking, advice makes investors better off. 
The welfare analysis in Corollary 1 views investor trust in managers as a legitimate source 
of utility (e.g., reflecting the manager’s true tighter distribution on asset returns).  One might object 
to  this  assumption,  arguing  that  trust  is  at  least  in  part  illusory  due  to  investors’  misplaced 
confidence  in  the  manager’s  expertise.    Even  in  this  case,  however,  the  presence  of  money 17 
 
managers may improve investors’ “objective” welfare.  Although blind trust may distort investment 
decisions (sometimes inducing too much risk-taking), it still allows investors to access a risky asset 
with a higher expected return and experience lower anxiety than they could on their own.   A full 
discussion of this case is beyond the scope of this paper.      
 
III. Multiple Financial Products 
So far, we have allowed money managers to offer investors a single, well-diversified risky 
portfolio  (e.g.,  the  S&P  500).    In  reality,  institutions  such  as  mutual  fund  families,  financial 
planners, funds of funds, and brokerage firms offer a broad range of assets and sector-specific 
investment options, and investors individually choose how much to invest in each.  To understand 
this practice, we allow money managers to break down their product line into specialized asset 
classes  and  then  let  investors  choose  between  them.    These  asset  classes  are  also  portfolios 
assembled by the manager, so trust is still important.  Individual asset classes, however, are not 
fully diversified (e.g., they consist of only industrial or high-tech stocks).  In this setting, we ask 
two questions.  First, does fee-setting by money managers distort investors’ mix of different sector-
specific funds?  Second, how do optimal fees depend on sector-specific risk and return?     
The formal structure works as follows.  There are two uncorrelated risky assets (or, more 
appropriately,  asset  classes)  1  and  2.    Asset           yields  excess  return    with  variance   .  
There is a positive relationship between risk and expected return.  In particular, asset 1 has lower 
risk and expected return than asset 2, that is,         and        .  Let      be the wealth invested 
by a generic investor i in asset z = 1, 2.  We then have the following lemma. 
LEMMA 1: For any total amount     +      of risky investment, investors’ optimal portfolio places 
a relative share 
    
    
  (
  
  
) (
  
  
) of wealth in asset 1 relative to asset 2. 
This  optimal  portfolio  represents  the  normative  benchmark  of  our  analysis,  under  the 
assumptions of rational expectations and no management fees.  In this respect, we can view the 18 
 
excess return   and the variance   of the risky asset in the previous section as those delivered by 
the optimal portfolio of Lemma 1. 
Money managers offer assets 1 and 2 separately, and at different fees, to investors.  At 
       , each manager           optimally sets the fees (           ) for investing in asset 1 and 2, 
respectively. Given fees (           ), each investor   decides whether to invest in asset           under 
manager   or   and  how  much  to invest in each asset.    By  so  doing,  investors  choose  –  in a 
decentralized  fashion  –  the  composition  of  their  portfolios.  Managers  affect  portfolios  via  the 
equilibrium  fee  structure  (           ).  We  assume  that  investors  correctly  perceive  the  return  of 
different assets, but relax this assumption in Section IV.  
Denote by        investor i’s risk-taking in asset           under manager          .  Given 
the management fee      , the analysis of Section II implies that an investor who has hired manager   
to invest in asset class   will choose  
  ̂       
(          )
      
                                                             (  ) 
The investor places more wealth in the asset having the highest expected excess return (net of fees) 
per unit of risk. The analysis of Section II immediately implies that a generic investor i delegates his 
investment in asset z to manager A (rather than B) when 
    
    
 
(          ) 
(          )                                                      (  ) 
that is, when the relative trust of investor   in manager   is sufficient to compensate for the relative 
expected excess return promised by   on risky asset  . 
Define       
   as the optimal investment after (11) is taken into account.  Then, at        , 
money managers set their fees (                       ). The profit of money manager   is equal to 
  (                       )           ∫       
 
 
          ∫       
 
 
                         (  ) 
which is the sum of the fees obtained from assets under management in the two risky assets. 19 
 
Given the additive objective function in (12), manager   maximizes the sum of two profit 
functions – one for asset 1, the other for asset 2 – each of which is identical to that in equation (6) 
but defined for a different return-variance configuration. The same principle holds for manager  , 
whose overall profit function adds two asset-specific versions of equation (7).  By solving for the 
Nash Equilibrium of this game, we can characterize the market equilibrium as follows. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: In the unique, symmetric, competitive equilibrium, fees are given by 
     
         
    (
 
     
)   
  
 
                                                       (  ) 
Investors take risk only with their most trusted manager and they select asset shares 
      
 
      
   
     
     
                                                       (  ) 
The total amount of assets managed (equally split between   and  ) is equal to 
∫ ∑ (      
          
  )
     
  
 
  (
     
     
)   ∑
  
          
                      (  ) 
 
From equation (13), it is clear that money managers extract a fixed share of the expected 
return above the riskless rate of any asset they offer to investors.  As a consequence, our model 
accounts for the fact that money managers charge higher unit fees for investing in asset classes with 
higher risk and higher expected return.  For example, Bogle (1998) finds that higher expense ratio 
bond funds tend to offset their higher fees by taking both more credit risk and more duration risk. 
This is exactly the prediction of our model under the reasonable assumption that higher risk entails 
higher expected return.  Our model further predicts that the link between fees and returns should be 
steeper when trust dispersion   is higher.  Perhaps this prediction might shed light on incentive fees 
in hedge funds and private equity funds, where trust plays such a fundamental role in mediating 
investments.  
Interestingly,  optimal  fees  do  not  distort  portfolios:  investors  mix  the  two  assets  as  in 
Lemma  1  (see  equation  (14)).  This  is  because  the  manager  extracts  the  same  fraction  of  the 20 
 
expected return from both asset classes, without affecting their relative expected returns.  Total fees 
do not change relative to the case in which managers offer just the portfolio of Lemma 1. These 
results change when investors misperceive the expected returns of different assets. 
 
IV. Biased Expectations of Asset Returns and Pandering 
We next investigate a model in which investors do not hold rational expectations regarding 
the relative returns of asset classes, but money managers do.  Investors might extrapolate returns on 
some assets and chase categories that previously performed well, or seek to invest in new products. 
Extrapolation has been discussed extensively in behavioral finance with respect to both individual 
securities and markets (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998)) and mutual funds (Frazzini and Lamont (2008)). 
We capture this idea by assuming that investors believe that the excess return of asset class 
(or “asset” for simplicity)   is     , where subscript e denotes investors’ expectation.  Beliefs are 
erroneous  whenever            for at  least  one asset          .    The perception  of  variances  is 
correct.  We focus on the case in which investors invert the ranking of expected returns, that is, 
           .  Since asset 2 delivers the higher objective return, investors inflate the return per unit of 
risk of asset 1 (                 ).  We refer to asset 1 as the “hot asset” and asset 2 as the “cold 
asset.”  This implies that investment in asset 2 is most profitable (with extrapolative expectations, 
this is due to mean reversion).  The best strategy from the investor’s viewpoint is contrarian. 
By  allowing  for  investor  misperceptions  we  can  ask  whether  money  managers  find  it 
profitable to pander to investor tastes, or whether they choose fee structures that correct investor 
errors.  Answering this question may allow us to address what appears to be the empirically relevant 
possibility of investment advisors underperforming  passive strategies even before fees (Malkiel 
(1995), Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009), Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010)), as well as study 
the determinants of product proliferation in the money management industry.  We proceed in two 
steps.  To begin, we study the incentives to pander by assuming that managers face only the one-21 
 
period problem considered so far.  The analysis of Section IV.A highlights the basic incentive for 
managers  to  pander  in  that  model.      Section  IV.B  extends  the  basic  model  by  having  money 
managers operate for two periods.  This allows us to incorporate into our setup the conventional 
view that managers have an incentive to act as contrarians in order to establish a reputation for 
being skilled.  This extension allows us to directly compare the short-run incentive of managers to 
pander with the mitigating long-run incentive to establish a reputation.  
    
A. Investors’ Misperceptions, Product Proliferation, and Pandering with Short Horizons 
The  setup  here  is  the  same  as  in  our  previous  analysis,  except  that  now  investors 
misperceive excess returns. To gauge the implication of this change, it suffices to note that risk-
taking by investors in equation (10) and their choice of manager in equation (11) are shaped by the 
perceived  return       of  asset  (class)    and  not  by  its  true  return    .    As  a  consequence, 
management fees are equal to a constant fraction of investors’ perceived return, 
     
         
    (
 
     
)   
    
 
                                                   (  ) 
and investors allocate their wealth across assets according to their perceived returns,  
      
 
      
   
       
       
  
In this situation, the following property holds. 
 
COROLLARY 2: In the unique, symmetric, equilibrium prevailing when managers offer the two 
assets separately, fees are higher for investing in the hot asset than in the cold asset and investors 
place too much wealth in the hot asset relative to the benchmark of Lemma 1.   
 
Because managers optimally extract a constant fraction of an asset’s perceived expected 
return, total fees are higher for “hot” assets, such as growth stocks as compared to value stocks, or 
specialty funds compared to diversified funds, but investors still want to disproportionally invest in 
them.    Money  managers  maximize  their  profits  by  encouraging,  or  at  least  not  discouraging, 22 
 
investors to take excessive risks in hot asset classes. In this sense, money  managers pander to 
investors’ biases rather than correct them.
8  
Money managers could correct investor misperceptions by setting a sufficiently high fee in 
the hot asset class that investors choose to hold the two assets in the proportions dictated by Lemma 
1 (or they could offer investors the optimal portfolio of Lemma 1).  To see why managers have no 
incentive to do so,  consider their equilibrium profits.  Given the perceived returns (          ), a 
manager’s profit is proportional to the average squared perceived return across the two assets, 
 
 
  ∑
    
 
        
                                                                 (  ) 
A manager’s profits are quadratic in expected returns     .  Intuitively, a higher perceived expected 
return increases profits by both i) increasing the fee charged by the manager, and ii) increasing the 
asset base over which the fee is collected.  Equation (17) implies that the manager benefits from the 
investor chasing hot asset classes, which more than compensates for underinvestment in cold assets.    
Corollary 2 might help account for a great deal of evidence mentioned in the introduction 
about poor performance of mutual funds, their high fees, and the negative relationship between 
performance and fees.  Poor performance in our model results from investing in overvalued assets, 
which investors prefer when they form extrapolative expectations.  Such a portfolio allocation in 
turn enables managers or advisors to charge higher fees.  In fact, in our model higher fees are 
precisely  a  consequence  of  managers  pandering  to  investor  preferences  for  assets  that  are 
overvalued.   The model thus accounts for the findings of Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and Del 
Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2010).  It is also consistent with the evidence in Mullainathan, Noeth, 
and Schoar (2012) that advisors direct investors toward hot sector funds.   
Both the proliferation of investment options and the prevalence of fund families naturally 
arise in our model.   Mutual fund families can be interpreted as a vehicle to harness trust and 
increase profits across multiple asset classes (Massa (2003)).  Proliferation of investment options 
within asset classes helps raise demand for risky assets (and fees) from trusting investors who chase 23 
 
returns.  The same interpretation would apply to private wealth management firms with extensive 
in-house portfolio capabilities.   A trusted advisor has a strong incentive to offer a wide range of 
products to his clients, who can then move funds around while paying the advisor’s fees.   
 
B. Investor Extrapolation and Pandering by Money Managers with Long Horizons 
Conventional wisdom holds that managers benefit from investing in undervalued assets 
because doing so allows them to earn superior returns, establish a reputation for being skilled, and 
attract clients. We now introduce this motivation for contrarianism into our model by allowing 
managers to earn positive alpha, thus enabling investors to update their estimates of skill based on 
past performance.  We show that trust encourages pandering.  When trust is important, managers 
can extract such high fees from pandering that the long-run incentive for contrarianism is too weak.
9  
There are three periods              and  two  generations  of  investors  that  live  for  one 
period; one generation is born at        , and the other at        .  Managers select portfolios for 
their clients, so that pandering is equivalent to the manager tilting his portfolio towards the hot asset 
class. At the cost of greater complexity, we could have continued with the previous model where 
pandering works through fees.   
At        , each manager sets a portfolio and a fee for the first generation of investors, who 
choose which manager to hire. At        , investors belonging to the new generation are born, they 
update their beliefs on managers’ abilities based on interim returns, and they choose managers. 
Returns do not affect trust, so the distribution of trust among investors toward managers   and   is 
the same at         and        .  The realized return of asset           at           under manager 
          is given by 
  ̃                                                                                (  ) 
In (  ),    is the excess return of asset class  ,      is the additional expected return arising from the 
ability of manager  , and      is a serially uncorrelated shock capturing the manager’s luck.  Both 24 
 
managers and investors are uninformed about    , which is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance   at t = 0.  The distribution of luck      is also normal, with mean zero and variance η.  
Skill here is best viewed as capturing the ability to assemble a portfolio within an asset class.  
In equation (  ), all volatility in returns is manager-specific, so there is no motive for 
diversifying portfolios across asset classes          .  We could add a diversification motive to the 
model, but at the cost of added complexity.  The optimal strategy here is to invest only in the 
undervalued asset 2.  A pandering manager, however, invests only in the overvalued asset 1, just as 
in the one-period model of Section IV.A.  Denote by    the portfolio share that manager   invests in 
asset class 1.  The manager charges a fee equal to     , where    is the fee per unit of return.  
Expressing fees in this way renders the model more tractable without affecting our results. 
To  solve  the  model,  consider  how  investors  assess  managerial  ability  after  observing 
portfolio returns at t = 1.  An investor attributes any difference between the expected and realized 
return   ̃    to skill or luck according to Bayesian updating.
10  As a consequence, at        , manager 
  knows that his assessed ability at         is normally distributed with mean 
   ̃    [  (         )   (      )(         )](
 
     
)                         (  ) 
and variance  .  The manager can boost his average assessed ability    ̃  by investing more in the 
undervalued asset 2.  Indeed, if the manager invests in an asset that investors are too optimistic 
about, the future disappointing returns will be attributed to low managerial skill rather than the asset 
itself.  In contrast, contrarianism creates a positive abnormal expected return (         ) that leads 
investors  to  upgrade  their  estimates  of  managerial  skill.
11    This  is  the  classic  motive  for 
contrarianism, which in our model conflicts with the incentive to pander described in Section III.   
The timeline of the model is as follows.  Denote by (     ) the fee and portfolio chosen by 
manager   at        , and by (  
    
 ) the fee and portfolio chosen by manager   at        .  The 
sequence of events in our model is graphically represented in Figure 2. 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of the model with managerial skill. 
 
We solve the model backwards, starting with the final period        .  After the returns 
(  ̃      ̃   ) on initial portfolios are realized, investors form average ability assessments (  ̃    ̃ ).  
Given these assessments, each manager assembles a new portfolio   
  and sets a fee   
 . 
At        , the timing above creates a tension between two forces.  From the viewpoint of 
future profits, a manager has an incentive to be contrarian in order to enhance his assessed skill, 
which allows him to attract more investments and charge higher fees at        .  In contrast, from 
the viewpoint of current profits, the manager has an incentive to pander in order to attract more 
investment and charge higher fees at        .  Proposition 3 shows that in our model the incentive to 
be contrarian always dominates when there is no manager-specific trust. 
 
PROPOSITION  3:  In  the  absence  of  manager-specific  trust,  i.e.,      ,  there  is  never  an 
equilibrium in which both managers pander to investors, i.e.,            . 
 
When      , managers engage in Bertrand competition.  As a consequence, even if both managers 
pander, their profits at         are equal to zero.  Each manager then sees no cost of deviating to 
contrarianism.  Even if contrarianism causes a manager to lose current clients, it does not reduce his 
current profits, which are zero anyway. The benefit of contrarianism is still material, however, even 
if investors are fully mobile (     ): the manager deviating to the undervalued asset can extract a 
t = 0 
Each  manager  j  =  A,  B  sets 
his fee and portfolio (𝜑𝑗 𝜔𝑗)  
Investors choose a manager.  
t = 1 
Returns on portfolios are realized, new 
investors assess managerial ability. 
Each manager j = A, B sets a new fee 
and portfolio (𝜑𝑗
  𝜔𝑗
 ). 
New investors choose a manager. 
t = 2 
Returns on portfolios 
are realized. 26 
 
fee thanks to his perceived higher ability in the future.  Hence, in the absence of manager-specific 
trust, there is no equilibrium in which both managers pander. 
Matters change when manager-specific trust is present.  Now pandering allows managers to 
extract  rents from  their  clients  at        ,  so  that  the  cost of  being  contrarian is  positive.  This 
suggests  that now  both  managers  may  choose  to  pander.   Unfortunately,  we cannot  perform  a 
general analysis of the case in which       because dynamic updating of fees and the nonlinearity 
of fund flows render the model intractable.  To shed light on the intuition for why the presence of 
trust can allow for the existence of equilibria in which both managers pander, consider the extreme 
case in which trust is so strong that investors are fully attached to their preferred managers.  This 
amounts to assuming that all investors have       , so that they are all maximally unwilling to leave 
their trusted manager.  This assumption is more extreme than setting      , because the latter case 
still allows many investors in the middle of the distribution to trust both managers. 
When all investors have       , investors are fully immobile and each manager acts as an 
intertemporal  monopolist.    If  he  panders,  he  extracts  fees  related to  investor misperceptions at 
       .  At the same time, his assessed ability will decline in expectation.  As a result, even if the 
manager is a monopolist and his clients do not leave him, he is hurt by skill downgrades, which 
reduce the amount of capital his clients give him to manage in the future.  In this sense, pandering 
still entails a cost to the manager.  The Internet Appendix proves the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: In the case of monopolistic managers, the equilibrium in which both managers 
pander arises if and only if managers are sufficiently impatient (  is sufficiently low) and/or the 
signal-to-noise ratio     is sufficiently low.  In particular, when the two assets are equally mis-
valued, that is, (         )   (         ), pandering arises if and only if 
   
    (     )
    (      )
 
    
        
 
[(         )   (         )]           
                            (  )  
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In the case of super-high trust described by Proposition 4, the incentive to pander can be so 
strong that no manager chooses to be contrarian.  Because trust fully ties investors to their own 
managers,  each  manager  can  charge  high  fees  that  extract  part  of  the  perceived  excess  return 
delivered  to  his  clients.  At         then,  the  manager  chooses  the  strategy  –  pandering  or 
contrarianism – that yields in expectation over time the larger perceived excess return.  In line with 
this intuition, equation (  ) says that the manager prefers pandering to contrarianism when: i) his 
intertemporal discount rate is high (i.e.,   is low), or ii) the signal-to-noise ratio of managerial skill 
is  low  (i.e.,     is  low).  Both  factors  reduce  the  return  to  contrarianism  relative  to  that  of 
pandering.
11 
In sum, the model says that when fees/profits are low, money managers have an incentive to 
gain  market  share  in  the  future  by  investing  in  undervalued  assets  today.    When,  in  contrast, 
fees/profits are high, money managers may have an incentive to exploit their current market power 
by pandering to investors’ beliefs.  These different equilibrium configurations have important social 
welfare implications.  Because the return in the cold sector is higher than in the hot one (i.e., 
       ), managers behaving as “benevolent doctors” facilitate desirable financial intermediation, 
while panderers “abuse” investor trust, reducing social welfare.  
 
V. Implications 
  An important message of Section IV is that, in many circumstances, managers have a strong 
incentive to pander to their investors’ beliefs.  The incentive for contrarianism is much weaker than 
it would be if clients were foot-loose.  In situations in which investor beliefs are misguided and 
highly correlated across investors, money managers pursue similar strategies that pander to these 
misguided beliefs while dividing the market based on the trust of their clients.  
  This message has a number of significant implications.  First, it suggests that the forces of 
arbitrage in financial markets might be weaker than one might have thought.  Previous research 
focuses on the limits of arbitrage because arbitrage is risky, or because arbitrageurs have limited 28 
 
access to capital (e.g., De Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Here we show that, in 
effect, professional money managers who are perfectly capable of arbitrage themselves turn into 
noise traders, because doing so brings them higher fees from their trusting investors.  With massive 
amounts  of  investor  wealth  guided  by  such  trust  relationships,  capital  following  noise  trading 
strategies is increased, and arbitrage capital correspondingly diminished.  In equilibrium, markets 
become more volatile. 
  Second, when many investors seek a particular hot product, such as internet stocks or bonds 
promising a higher yield without extra risk, competing money managers cater to these demands and 
help  destabilize  prices.    The  technology  bubble  in  the  U.S.  saw  mutual  funds  shifting  into 
technology  stocks,  and  even  so-called  “value  investors”  turning  to  “growth-at-the-right-price” 
strategies, which essentially amounted to chasing the bubble.  More recently, prime money market 
funds shifted into short-term “safe” liabilities of financial institutions yielding higher rates than 
Treasury bills.  We have not modeled endogenous price determination here, but one can see how 
such investment strategies can be destabilizing.  In particular, as more money managers cater to 
investor beliefs, prices of securities that investors favor will tend to rise, which will only encourage 
these  strategies  in  the  short  run,  as  well  as  improve  managerial  reputations  (see  Barberis  and 
Shleifer (2003)).  The long run over which contrarianism pays will become even longer and less 
attractive from the viewpoint of profit-maximizing managers.   
  We should not forget, however, the central point of trust-mediated money management – 
that it enables investors to take risks, and earn returns, that they might otherwise not obtain.  There 
are surely significant distortions in portfolio allocation, which are inevitable when investors exhibit 
psychological biases.  Despite these distortions, financial advice and money management represent 
an important service.   The growth of the financial industry, described most recently by Philippon 
(2012) and Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013), might first and foremost reflect the growing demand 
for this service as investor wealth and trust in markets have increased over time.  
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1 Berk and Green (2004) argue that low net-of-fee alphas result from competition among 
investors for access to more skilled managers, who charge higher fees.  This theory is 
challenging to reconcile with negative average after-fee performance, with large fees many 
investors  pay  to  brokers  and  advisors  who  help  choose  funds,  and  with  the  evidently 
negative relationship between fees and gross-of-fee performance (e.g., Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-
Verdú (2009)).  
2 Monopoly power in undifferentiated goods is also present in the models of Carlin (2009) 
and Gabaix and Laibson (2006).  In these models, firms create irrelevant complexity to 
obfuscate the homogeneity of their goods, and thus to extract surplus from less  informed 
consumers. 
3 A similar assumption is made in the models of Basak and Cuoco (1998) and Cuoco and 
Kaniel (2011). 
4 Because investors end up hiring their most trusted managers, one should view parameter a 
as  capturing  the  overall  trust  that  investors  have  in  managers.  In  turn,   captures  the 
dispersion of trust across the two managers. A higher   increases both the average mistrust 
in the less trusted manager and the heterogeneity across investors in the substitutability 
between the two managers.        
5 The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on the Journal of 
Finance website. 
6 This fee structure is consistent with widespread market practice. Performance fees would 
not be useful in this model when investors hold rational expectations, because there are no 
agency conflicts between investors and managers. Performance fees may be useful when 35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
investors hold biased expectations of returns. Even in that case, which we study in Section 
IV, we keep the fee structure unchanged to focus on a nonprice market mechanism, namely, 
the manager’s reputational concern. 
7 Potentially, assets under management may be higher than the initial wealth of investors. 
This occurs when the expected excess return   is so high that investors wish to lever up by 
setting     
      . 
8 Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) obtain a similar result in a very different model, where 
employees of financial intermediaries sell inappropriate products because they are given 
distorted incentives by their firms.    
9 Dasgupta and Prat (2006) show that career concerns may sometimes induce portfolio 
managers to  trade  excessively,  contrary  to  the  interest s  of  their clients.    Our  model 
alternatively  stresses  the  conventional,  positive,  view  of  career  concerns.  See  also 
Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011a, 2011b).  
10 Here we simplify the analysis by assuming that investors do not update their beliefs 
about assets 1 and 2. Formally, the investor has a concentrated prior on asset returns. We 
could allow the investor to update on  both managerial ability and excess return, but this 
would greatly complicate the analysis.  
11 Again, this logic goes through under the alternative assumption that upon observing an 
unexpectedly high return investors upgrade their beliefs about both manage rial ability and 
the return of the asset in which the manager’s  portfolio is  intensive.  In this  case, the 
algebra is substantially more complex. The real restriction in our analysis concerns the 
naivete of investors, who are assumed not to infer anything about asset quality when seeing 
the manager’s portfolio choices at t = 0. 36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 The same qualitative conditions guarantee the existence of double-pandering equilibria in 
a linearized version of the model for the general case in which      . (In this linearization, 
a  manager’s       and       profits  are  linearized  around  the  state  in  which  the  two 
managers have the same returns and assessed abilities.) 
 